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IN THE UTAH COURT OF * PPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaint if£ Appellee, 
vs. 
JAMES W. RAGGETT, 
Defendant \ \ ppellant. 
Case No 20000982-C A 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
I'llifi l i»li' uiiiotd il s "J"< "\« H?)le). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
constiti:* ' *u Jiiense of forgery as defined by ^utii v^^ de Annotated § 76-6-501. 
This issue presents this Court with a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
See State v. UaiL 'VO I. 
11 i *>stic i appeal was raised in ' :-cllant's Motion to Dismiss, filed on August 
9, 2000, (R. 14-1S,, and was addressed at the hearing on August 25, 20O0. (R. 56 at 3-6). 
1 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 7QA-3-109 
Payable to bearer or to order 
(1) A promise or order is payable to the bearer if it: 
(b) does not state a payee; 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-407 
Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered property, 
A person commits theft when: 
(1) He obtains property of another which he knows to have been lost or 
mislaid, or to have been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the 
recipient or as to the nature or amount of the property, without taking 
reasonable measures to return it to the owner; and 
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of the property when he 
obtains the property or at any time prior to taking the measures designated 
in paragraph (1). 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501 
Forgery— Writing Defined 
A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such 
altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, 
or utters any writing so that the writing or the making , completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original existed. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Baggett appeals from the September 22, 2000, Judgement, Sentence, and 
Commitment of the Honorable Guy R. Bumingham, Fourth District Court, after a denial 
of a motion to dismiss and the entry of a conditional plea to attempted forgery. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court 
On July 11, 2000, Baggett was charged with one count of Forgery, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501 (R. 3). 
On August 9, 2000, Baggett filed a Motion to Dismiss (R. 14-18). Appellant's 
Motion to Dismiss was heard, considered, and denied in the Fourth District Court by 
Judge Guy R. Bumingham on August 25, 2000 (R. 33-36, 56 at 3-6). 
On September 1, 2000, Baggett entered into a conditional plea of "No Contest" to 
charges of attempted forgery, pending the outcome of this appeal (R. 30, 37-39). On 
September 22, 2000, Baggett was sentenced but said sentence was stayed by Judge 
Bumingham while this matter was appealed (R. 42-43). On October 20, 2000, Baggett 
filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court (R. 45). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On July 3, 2000, Daryll Allen made out a check in the amount of $110.00. Allen 
signed the check but left the "payee" portion of check blank. (R. 36). 
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2. The check was then lost in the Provo City Center area. Upon discovering that the 
check was missing, Allen reported the missing check to First Security Bank on July 3, 
2000. (R. 36). 
3. On July 3, 2000, Baggett entered into a First Security branch in Orem and uttered 
the check to a teller for cashing. Baggett was now named on the check as payee (R. 35). 
Baggett told the bank teller that he had been given the check as payment (R. 35). 
4. Baggett was detained at the Orem bank and after Miranda warnings were given, 
confessed to finding the check in Provo and filling in the "payee" portion of the check. 
(R. 35). 
5. Baggett was charged with Forgery on July 11, 2000. (R. 3). 
6. On August 9, 2000, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that his act of 
filling-in the "payee" portion of the check does not constitute forgery because Baggett did 
not complete or utter any writing "purporting to be the act of another" (R. 14-18). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The filling in a payee's name on a check that does not name a payee and 
presenting it for payment is not an act of forgery because such action it does not 
constitute the completion or utterance of a writing purporting to be the act of another as 
required by Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-501. Baggett asserts that his actions, at best, 
constitute theft of lost or mislaid property, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-407 
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ARGUMENT 
Baggett asserts that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the provisions of the 
Utah Commercial Code governing the making, issuing and transferring of negotiable 
instruments is in applicable to this case. In order to convict Baggett of forgery under 
these facts, the State had to prove that he completed a writing—in this case a check. 
Baggett asserts that it is the provisions of the Utah Commercial Code which determines 
when a check is complete as a negotiable instrument. 
A check is a negotiable instrument. See Utah Code Annotated Section 70A-3-104. 
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code states that a promise or order to pay in a negotiable 
instrument can be made payable to either a named individual or to any bearer and that a 
promise or order is payable to the bearer if it "does not state a payee." U.C.A. § 70A-3 
109(l)(b). Utah Code Annotated § 70A-1-201(5) defines "bearer" as "the person in 
possession of an instrument... payable to bearer or indorsed in blank." 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the Uniform Commercial Code defines 
a negotiable instrument from four criteria: " Specifically, it must (1) evidence a signature 
by the maker or drawer, (2) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum 
certain in money, (3) be payable on demand or at a definite time, and (4) be payable to 
order or to bearer." Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., Ill P.2d 697 (Utah, 1986). Baggett 
asserts that when he found the check, it was already a completed negotiable instrument. 
One, the check was signed by the maker. Two, the check contained an unconditional 
promise to pay a sum certain in money. Three, the check was payable on demand. Four, 
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the check was payable to the bearer-Baggett—because it did not state a payee. 
Accordingly, Judge Burningham's conclusion that the check was not complete until 
Baggett filled in his name as payee is erroneous because the check was already a 
completed writing or negotiable instrument which was payable to him as bearer prior to 
his act of writing his name on the check as payee. 
In State v. Donaldson, 385 P.2d 151, (Utah, 1963), a case in which a defendant 
was convicted of issuing a bad check, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the instrument 
the defendant had issued was, indeed, a check even though the defendant had not named 
an identifiable payee. The Court stated: 
It is well settled by authority that the omission to insert in an instrument the name 
of a payee is not a feature or a defect which affects negotiability. The effect of the 
omission to name a payee is to invest any bona fide holder with the authority to fill in the 
blank left for that purpose by the drawer or maker. Such instruments are payable to the 
bearer until restricted in their currency as negotiable instruments by the insertion of the 
name of some particular payee. 
385 P.2d at 151-52. 
Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, the check uttered by Appellant 
was a complete negotiable instrument, payable to any bearer. Appellant, in inserting his 
name in the blank space provided to name the payee, did not complete the check or 
commit an act "purporting to be the act of another." Rather, by leaving the check blank 
as to the payee, the maker, himself, had already completed the writing and made the 
check payable to any bearer, including Baggett and that no action was taken by Baggett 
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which purported to be the act of the maker because the check was already payable to him 
as bearer as per Donaldson. 
Moreover, Baggett asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that he uttered 
the check so as to purport it to be the act of another (R. 34). Black's Law Dictionary 
(Sixth Edition) at page 1547 defines "utter" in relation to forgery statutes as follows: "To 
utter, as used in a statute against forgery and counterfeiting, means to offer, whether 
accepted or not, a forged instrument, with the representation, by words or actions, that the 
same is genuine." The check found by Baggett that he presented to the bank was not a 
forged instrument because it was already a completed negotiable instrument/writing at the 
time he found it. When the maker signed the check, made it payable for a specific dollar 
amount on demand to any bearer he authorized payment to any bearer including Baggett; 
Baggett, in presenting the check to the bank to be cashed, did not—and legally could not— 
take any action purporting to be that of another because he as bearer he was already 
legally entitled to utter that check. 
Admittedly, when Baggett found the check on the street, he reasonable knew that it 
had been lost. In addition, he made no reasonable effort to return it to Allen, and 
evidenced an intent to deprive Allen of the funds represented by the check. Under these 
facts Baggett is probably guilty of theft of lost or mislaid property under Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-407. Baggett asserts, however, that he is not guilty of forgery because 
he neither completed a writing or uttered a forged writing purporting to be the act of 
another. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons asserted heretofore, Baggett respectfully requests that this Court 
correct the trial court's conclusion that his action legally constituted the offense of 
forgery. Appellant further prays this Court to remand this case back to the trial court and 
for withdrawal of Baggett's plea and prosecution under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-407. 
DATED this ( day of April, 2001. 
Margaret/. Lindsay £/ 
Attorney for the Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief Of Appellant to the Utah Attorney General, Appeals Division, Heber 
Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
'k-k-k'k'k'k'k'k 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES W. BAGGETT, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Hon. Guy R. Burningham 
MOTION 
COMES NOW, JAMES W. BAGGETT, by and through his 
attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, and pursuant to Rule 
25(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, hereby moves 
for this Court's Order dismissing the Information filed in this 
matter for the reason that the allegations of such Information do 
not constitute the crime charged in the Information. 
FACTS 
Without admitting to the following facts, Defendant 
believes the State's factual assertions relevant to this motion 
are set forth in the investigating officer's probable cause 
statement. The probable cause affidavit filed in this case by 
Orem City Officer McCombs indicates that the Defendant is alleged 
to have filled in his name on the "pay to order of" line on a 
check he had found and thereafter attempted to cash the check. 
The check had been signed by the owner of the account, Derryl 
Allen who lost the check somewhere in Provo. Mr. Allen had not 
filled in a named payee; the "pay to the order of" line was left 
blank. Mr. Allen did not know Defendant and had intended to use 
the check to purchase two badges. 
ARGUMENT 
Summary of Argument: 
The completion of a check by filling in a payee's name 
on a check that does not name a payee is not an act of forgery; 
Defendant's actions are at best theft of lost or mislaid property 
in the amount of $110.00, a class B misdemeanor. 
****** 
A check is a negotiable instrument.1 A promise or order 
to pay in a negotiable instrument can be made payable to either a 
Sections 70A-3-104(a) and 70A-3-104(f). 
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named individual or to any bearer (holder)2. The Utah Supreme 
Court has indicated that the Uniform Commercial Code defines a 
negotiable instrument from four criteria: "Specifically, it must 
(i) evidence a signature by the maker or drawer, (ii) contain an 
unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money, 
(iii) be payable on demand or at a definite time, and (iv) be 
payable to order or to bearer."3 A negotiable instrument is 
payable to the bearer if the instrument does not state a payee.4 
In a case in which a defendant was convicted of issuing 
a bad check, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the instrument the 
defendant had issued was, indeed, a check even though the 
defendant had not named an identifiable payee. 
It is well settled by authority that the 
omission to insert in an instrument the name of a payee 
is not a feature or a defect which affects 
negotiability. The effect of the omission to name a 
payee is to invest any bona fide holder with the 
authority to fill in the blank left for that purpose by 
the drawer or maker. Such instruments are payable to 
the bearer until restricted in their currency as 
negotiable instruments by the insertion of the name of 
some particular payee.5 
2Section 70A-3-109. 
3Calfo v D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1986). 
'Section 70A-3-109(a) (2) . 
5State v Donaldson, 385 P.2d 151 (Utah, 1963). 
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Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, the check 
uttered by Defendant was a complete negotiable instrument, 
payable to any bearer. Defendant, in inserting his name in the 
blank space provided to name the payee, did not commit an act 
"purporting to be the act of another". Rather, by leaving the 
check blank as to a payee, the maker, himself, made the check 
payable to any bearer, including this Defendant. And, as per 
Donaldson, as a bearer, Defendant had legal authority to fill in 
the blank space meant to identify a payee. 
Admittedly, when he found the check on the street, 
Defendant may have known it had been lost, made no reasonable 
effort to return it to Mr. Allen, and evidenced an intent to 
deprive Allen of the funds represented by the check. Because the 
value of the funds thus taken was $110.00, Defendant is more 
properly prosecuted under Section 76-6-407, Theft of Lost or 
Misplaced property, a class B misdemeanor. 
Dated August 9, 2000. 
Thomas H. Means 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT^ /WRT^ '^ /^'i;^ ';-,: 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH P/f. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. ) CASE NO. 001402693 
JAMES BAGGETT, ) Motion to Quash 
Defendant . ORIGINAL 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
125 NORTH 10 0 WEST 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
AUGUST 25, 2000 
FILED 
•"* * 9 2001 
Reported by: Creed Barker, CSR, RPR COURT 
Utah State Courts 
J 
Friday, August 25, 2 000 
MR. MEANS: It's my motion, so I111 go ahead. 
Frankly, I don't know how much I can add to the written 
motion that I made, which is my impression, what little I 
know about commercial paper is --
THE COURT: This isn't a case under the uniform 
commercial code. 
MR. MEANS: I understand. 
THE COURT: And under the forgery statute it says, 
"completion upon making, completing." And the allegation is 
that he completed the writing by inserting his name. 
MR. MEANS: Right. Here is how I see it, judge --
THE COURT: And he had no right to do that. I 
understand what you are --in effect you're saying, that he 
stole the money. 
MR. MEANS: I think it's a given that he completed 
it. I would be focusing on purporting to be the act of 
another, because, again, I think you have to fall back to 
commercial paper law to recognize that if you create the 
check, put all of the other elements in place --
THE COURT: It's a negotiable instrument. 
MR. MEANS: --it makes a negotiable instrument. 
THE COURT: But he made it a forgery by completing 
it, by making it payable to himself. 
MR. MEANS: As I say, he did complete it, but I 
Utah State Courts 
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1 donft think you can say thatf s purporting to be the act of 
2 another if the commercial paper law says you can create a 
3 check, leave a name off, and by operation of law it becomes 
4 payable to the bearer. So my position would be that the 
5 maker makes it payable to bearer as soon as he fails to 
6 insert a name. So even though the Defendant has completed 
7 it, he hasn't purported to be the act of another. 
8 THE COURT: I think itfs an interesting argument, 
9 but again it seems to fall squarely within the language of 
10 the forgery statute. Even if he had made it payable to cash, 
11 if he had found it already made payable to cash, and all he 
12 did -- they may have required him to endorse it, then I think 
IS- the commercial paper argument has more credibility because 
14 he!s only stolen the same as if he had stolen cash. But he 
15 actually completed it, and that language is there, if he 
16 completes it. 
17 MR. MEANS: If I understand the commercial code, 
18 leaving it blank creates a cash equivalent as if it were cash 
19 or had it written in cash, so that it's the same act. 
20 THE COURT; It makes it negotiable. In other words, 
21 someone who receives something like that and is authorized to 
22 insert their name -- on the payee line, is it? If they!re 
23 authorized to do that, they can do that under the commercial 
24 code. If they're not authorized, though, it doesn't destroy 
25 the negotiability of the instrument because bonified --
Utah State Courts 
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MR. MEANS: Holders. 
THE COURT: Purchasers or holders in due course may 
end up with it. And so that protects them, if somebody 
actually will take that risk. So while he took the risk,, it 
doesnft relieve someone else who is the wrong-doer and fits 
within the statute. Like I said, I did read it. 
MR. MEANS: I can't add much more to it than that. 
That's just my theory. 
THE COURT: It may be a basis for you to take it up, 
if the same act in this case is a misdemeanor and a felony. 
But to me, the forgery statute does fit in the context in 
which it was done. So I would deny your motion, I guess, to 
dismiss the felony — is that where we are? 
MR. MEANS: Right. Let me talk with Mr. Larson. 
MR. LARSON: Thank you for those oral arguments, 
judge. 
THE COURT: Well, I had read both of your memos, and 
it is an interesting question. 
THE CLERK: So motion to quash denied? 
THE COURT: Was this a motion to quash or motion to 
dismiss. 
MR. MEANS: Actually a motion to dismiss. We 
waived. 
THE COURT: Oh, you waived prelim. So it's a motion 
to dismiss. 
Utah State Courts 
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MR. MEANS: No matter how we do this, we111 probably 
have to come back. But we're contemplating entering a plea, 
but we'll need to put that in writing. So if we could have 
another date? 
THE COURT: Do you want to do it next week or the 
following week? The 1st or the 8th of September? 
MR. MEANS: One week would be fine, Judge. On your 
morning calendar? 
THE COURT: We could do it at 10:00 o'clock, 
September 1st, at 10. 
MR. MEANS: Okay. 
THE COURT: I think it's a good one for appeal, 
quite frankly. 
(Proceedings concluded.) 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 
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JAMES BAGGETT : Case No. 001402693 
Defendant (s) . : JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
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This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. The Court, having received and considered the Motion, 
together with memoranda in support and opposition thereto, and oral 
arguments taken at hearing held on August 25, 2000, being apprised 
on the premises, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Pursuant to apparent stipulation of the parties, the Court 
finds the following pertinent facts: 
1. That on 7/3/2000 the victim made out a check in the amount 
of $110.00. He signed it, but left the "payee" portion 
blank. 
2. That the check was then lost in the Provo City area. 
l 
3. That the victim immediately notified the bank of the lost 
check. 
4. That on 7/3/2000 the defendant entered a branch of the bank 
in Orem and uttered the check to a teller for cashing. At 
this time the check was complete, the defendant now being 
named as payee on the check. 
5. The defendant told the teller that "the victim gave him the 
check as a payment." 
6. That the defendant did not have the owner's authorization to 
complete the check by placing the defendant's name in its 
payee portion/blank. 
7. That the defendant did not know the owner. 
8. That the defendant made no effort to locate the check's 
owner, nor return the check to the owner. 
9. That the defendant was not given the check by the owner as a 
form of payment. 
10. That the defendant found the check in Provo City, completed 
the check by filling in his name as payee, and then uttered 
it to the teller to be cashed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court, having considered this matter, and being fully 
apprised on the premises, now enters conclusions of law as 
follows: 
2 
1. That the laws governing the making, issuing and transferring 
of negotiable instruments pursuant to the Utah Commercial 
Code, comprising sections 70A-3-101 et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended ("UCA"), do not apply to the 
matter before the bar. 
2. That provisions of sections 76-6-501, et seq., UCA, which 
govern, and define, the criminal act of forgery, apply to 
this matter. 
3. That pursuant to section 76-6-501(2), UCA, the check in 
question is a "writing." 
4. That pursuant to section 76-6-501(1), a person may commit 
the criminal offense of forgery if he: 
with purpose to defraud anyone . . . completes, . . . or 
utters any writing so that the writing or the . . . 
completion, . . . or utterance purports to be the act of 
another, . . . . [Editing added.] 
5. That the defendant did complete the writing, by entering his 
name into its payee section, without authorization of the 
writing's owner. 
6. That the defendant did utter the writing to the bank teller. 
7. That the defendant did complete and utter the writing with 
the purpose to defraud anyone. 
8. That the defendant did complete and utter the writing so as 
to purport it to be the act of another. 
3 
ORDER 
The court having entered appropriate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and being fully apprised on the premises, now 
enters the following: 
BE IT ORDERED AND DECREED: 
That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 
DATED this z day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
TOM MEANS 
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT 
BY THE COURT: 
, 2000 
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